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Abstract—Wireless secret key generation (W-SKG) from
shared randomness (e.g., from the wireless channel fading
realizations), is a well established scheme that can be used for
session key agreement. W-SKG approaches can be of particular
interest in delay constrained wireless networks and notably
in the context of ultra reliable low latency communications
(URLLC) in beyond fifth generation (B5G) systems. However
W-SKG schemes are known to be malleable over the so called
“advantage distillation” phase, during which observations of
the shared randomness are obtained at the legitimate parties.
As an example, an active attacker can act as a man-in-the-
middle (MiM) by injecting pilot signals and/or can mount denial
of service attacks (DoS) in the form of jamming. This paper
investigates the impact of injection and reactive jamming attacks
in W-SKG. First, it is demonstrated that injection attacks can
be reduced to – potentially less harmful – jamming attacks by
pilot randomization; a novel system design with randomized
QPSK pilots is presented. Subsequently, the optimal jamming
strategy is identified in a block fading additive white Gaussian
noise (BF-AWGN) channel in the presence of a reactive jammer,
using a game theoretic formulation. It is shown that the impact
of a reactive jammer is far more severe than that of a simple
proactive jammer.
Index Terms—Wireless secret key agreement, shared ran-
domness, injection attack, man-in-the-middle, denial of service
attack, jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades a large number of studies and
patents appeared on the topic of wireless secret key generation
(W-SKG) schemes that exploit channel reciprocity as the
source of shared randomness (see [1] for a comprehensive
review and [2] for a tutorial on physical layer security in-
cluding W-SKG). Additionally, W-SKG over unauthenticated
channels has been proposed in [3]. To overcome trivial higher-
layer man-in-the-middle (MiM) attacks, as with MiM attacks
on unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman schemes, physical layer
security technologies have been combined with standard au-
thentication and encryption (AE) schemes [4]. Furthermore, a
large number of practical demonstrators have provided “proof
of concept” [5], [6]. A resurgence of interest in W-SKG
has been witnessed recently as these technologies could be
considered for application in B5G systems [1], in particular
in the context of Internet of things (IoT) [7] and – potentially
– URLLC applications. W-SKG could be a good fit in these
systems as the limited computational resources and strict
delay constraints can render challenging the use of standard
security protocols such as the transport layer security protocol
(TLS) protocol and it’s IoT friendly version, the datagram
transport layer security (DTLS) protocol.
In recent works it has been shown that building seman-
tically secure AE protocols using the W-SKG procedure is
straightforward, as long as the channel probing phase of the
scheme is robust against active attacks [4], [8]. Therefore, an
important next step is to study MiM and denial of service
(DoS) attacks during the channel excitation phase of the W-
SKG protocol, commonly referred to as “advantage distilla-
tion” [4]. In this paper, two such active attacks, during channel
probing are discussed.
Firstly, MiM attacks, referred to as “injection” attacks, are
investigated in Section II: an active adversary tries to control
part of the generated secret key by spoofing the channel
estimation phase of the W-SKG scheme. Existing works have
considered jamming attacks and formulate these in game-
theoretic form [9], [10]. However, they have not considered
the close relationship between injection and jammming. Here
we propose a simple approach to mount such a MiM at-
tack, assuming that the adversary has one additional antenna
with respect to the legitimate users. This is a very mild
assumption with respect to the adversary’s capabilities and
reveals a critical vulnerability of W-SKG, that needs to be
addressed. As a countermeasure, we propose a concrete pilot
randomization scheme using quadrature amplitude phase shift
keying (QPSK) modulated random pilots. We prove that the
source of shared randomness remains Gaussian and that the
adversary can no longer mount the MiM attack. An interesting
conclusion of our analysis is that the MiM injection attack
is reduced to a jamming attack when pilot randomization is
employed.
Motivated by this result, in Sections III and IV, DoS in the
form of reactive jamming is studied for BF-AWGN channels
– used as an abstraction for orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) modulation systems. The attacker’s
optimal strategies are derived. In the present contribution
we assume that the legitimate users blindly adopt a uniform
power allocation policy, the level of which we optimally iden-
tify; the more general case of an arbitrary power allocation
for the legitimate parties will be investigated in the future.
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Fig. 1. Alice and Bob have single transmit and receive antennas and exchange
pilot signals X over a Rayleigh fading channel with realization H . A MiM,
Mallory, with multiple transmit antennas can inject a suitably pre-coded signal
PXJ , such that the received signal at both Alice and Bob coincide W =
HA
T
P = HB
T
P.
Our study demonstrates that a reactive jammer can have a far
more serious impact on the W-SKG process compared to a
simple proactive jammer. In the future, frequency hopping as
well as energy harvesting approaches to mitigate the impact
of reactive jammers [11] will be explored.
Finally, conclusions and further work are discussed in
Section V.
II. MIM IN W-SKG SYSTEMS: INJECTION ATTACKS
MiM in the form of injection attacks constitutes one of
the most critical limitations in W-SKG systems that extract
secret keys from received signal strength (RSS) measurements
[12]–[14]. Recently, various possible approaches for injection
attacks have been published: in [12], the attacker controlled
the movement of objects in an indoor wireless network,
thus generating predictable changes in the RSS, (e.g., by
obstructing, or not, a line-of-sight). In [13], whenever similar
channel envelope measurements in the links to the legitimate
nodes were observed, the MiM spoofed the W-SKG process
by injecting a strong signal. In the following we will prove
that – even when full CSI is used to extract the keys – it
suffices that the adversary has one additional antenna with
respect to the legitimate users to be able to mount an injection
MiM attack.
To capture the main components of MiM attacks in W-
SKG systems, we employ the system model depicted in
Fig. 1, comprising three nodes: a legitimate transmitter, its
intended receiver, and a MiM, referred to as Alice, Bob
and Mallory, respectively. Alice and Bob are assumed to
have a single antenna each for simplicity, while Mallory
has two transmit antennas.1 The fading channel realization
in the link Alice-Bob is denoted by the complex circularly
symmetric Gaussian random variable H ∼ CN (0, σ2). To
obtain estimates of H , Alice and Bob exchange pilot sig-
nals X with E[|X |2] ≤ P . Furthermore, following [13],
we assume Mallory has perfect knowledge of the channel
vectors in the multiple input single output (MISO) links
Mallory-Alice and Mallory-Bob. The channel coefficients
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), i.e., HA = [HA1, HA2]
T ,HB = [HB1, HB2]
T with
1It is straightforward to see that the scenario can easily be generalized to
a multi-antenna setting in which Mallory has one more antenna than Alice
and Bob.
(HA1, HA2, HB1, HB2) ∼ CN (0, σ2J/2 I4); this assumption
is realistic since Mallory can estimate the channel vectors
while Alice and Bob exchange pilot signals, as long as the
channel’s coherence time is respected (a plausible scenario in
slow fading, low mobility environments).
To mount the attack, Mallory transmits a signal XJ , suit-
ably precoded as PXJ . The precoding matrix P = [P1, P2]
T
is chosen such that the same signal is “injected” at both Alice
and Bob, i.e.,
HA
T
PXJ = HB
T
PXJ ⇒
P1 =
HB2 −HA2
HA1 −HB1P2, (1)
where, due to the i.i.d. assumption and to the continuous
distribution of the channels, HA1 6= HB1 almost surely.
As a result, Mallory can select a suitable precoding matrix
(among infinite possibilities). Assuming a total power con-
straint E[|PXJ |2] ≤ Γ for Mallory’s transmission, P2 should
be chosen as
P2 ≤
√
Γ∣∣∣HB2−HA2HA1−HB1 ∣∣∣ . (2)
This procedure, illustrated in Fig. 1, shows that it is possible
to generalize the injection attack presented in [13], in which
an attacker injected a strong signal whenever the RSS in
the Mallory-Alice and Mallory-Bob links were similar. More
importantly, the presented injection attack accounts not only
for the RSS but for the full CSI, i.e., it includes the signal
phase.
The observations at Alice and Bob, denoted by ZA and ZB ,
are
ZA = XH +W +NA (3)
ZB = XH +W +NB, (4)
where W = HA
T
PXJ = HB
T
PXJ denotes the observed
injected signal at Alice and Bob which is identical at both due
the precoding matrix P; and, NA, NB denote zero-mean unit
variance i.i.d. complex circularly symmetric Gaussian random
noise variables, i.e., NA, NB ∼ CN (0, 1). The secret key rate
controlled by Mallory is upper bounded by [8]
L ≤ I(ZA, ZB;W ). (5)
Identifying the optimal injection signal W , corresponds to
finding the capacity achieving input signal of the two-
look Gaussian channel in (3)-(4). This signal is known to
be Gaussian [15]; hence, a good choice for XJ is to be
constant, so that, the overall injected signal is an optimal
complex zero-mean circularly symmetric Gaussian signal,
W ∼ CN (0, σ2JΓ).
A countermeasure to injection attacks can be built by
randomizing the pilot sequence exchanged between Alice and
Bob [8], [14]. Here, we propose to randomize the pilots by
drawing them from a (scaled) QPSK modulation, as follows:
instead of transmitting the same probing signal X , Alice and
Bob transmit independent, random probe signals X and Y ,
respectively, drawn from i.i.d. zero-mean discrete uniform
distributions U({±r ± jr}), where j = √−1, r = √P/2,
so that, E [X ] = E [Y ] = 0, E
[|X |2] = E [|Y |2] = P
and E [XY ] = 0, i.e., the pilots are randomly chosen QPSK
signals. Alice’s observation ZA is modified accordingly as
ZA = Y H +W +NA, (6)
while Bob’s observation is given in (4). To establish shared
randomness in spite of the pilot randomization, Alice and
Bob post-multiply ZA and ZB by their randomized pilots,
obtaining local observations Z˜A and Z˜B (unobservable by
Mallory), expressed as:
Z˜A = XZA = XYH +XW +XNA, (7)
Z˜B = Y ZB = XYH + YW + Y NB. (8)
Lemma 1: The source of shared randomness, when the
pilots are randomized QPSK symbols, is a circularly sym-
metric zero mean Gaussian random variable, XYH ∼
CN (0, P 2σ2).
Proof: We treat the two orthogonal axes (real and imag-
inary) independently. Looking only at the real values of the
pilots and of the channel coefficient X,Y,H denoted here by
XR = Re(X), YR = Re(Y ) and HR = Re(H), we express
the underlying discrete uniform pdf fXR(x) and fYR(y) and
the continuous pdf fHR(h) as
fXR(x) =
1
2
δ(x− r) + 1
2
δ(x+ r), (9)
fYR(y) =
1
2
δ(y − r) + 1
2
δ(y + r), (10)
fHR(h) =
1√
πσ
e−
h2
σ2 . (11)
The pdf of the product XRHR is given as
fXRHR(z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fXR(x)fHR(z/x)
1
|x|dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
πσ|x|δ(x − r)e
−
(z/x)2
σ2 dx
+
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2
√
πσ|x|δ(x + r)e
−(z/x)2
σ2 dx
=
√
2e−
2z2
Pσ2√
πPσ
(12)
by substituting r =
√
P/2 at the last derivation, i.e.,
XRHR ∼ N (0, Pσ24 ). A similar result holds for the products
involving also the imaginary parts ofX andH :XIHI ,XIHR
and XRHI , so that XH ∼ CN (0, Pσ2). Extending this
result, we find that XHY ∼ CN (0, P 2σ2).
Furthermore, due to the fact that X and Y are inde-
pendent and have zero mean, the variables XW and YW
are uncorrelated, circularly symmetric zero-mean Gaussian
random variables, and, therefore independent, while the same
holds for XNA, Y NB, i.e., (XW,YW ) ∼ CN (0, σ2JPΓI2)
and (XNA, Y NB) ∼ CN (0, P I2). Alice and Bob extract
the common key from the modified source of common
randomness XYH as opposed to XH . On the other hand,
since XW,YW,XNA, Y NB are i.i.d. complex circularly
symmetric Gaussian random variables, the proposed scheme
reduces injection attacks to uncorrelated jamming attacks, i.e.,
using Lemma 1 we get that
L ≤ I
Ä
Z˜A, Z˜B;W
ä
= 0. (13)
III. JAMMING ATTACKS ON W-SKG
Building on the results of the previous section, we next
examine in detail the scenario in which Mallory acts as a
reactive jammer. Reactive jamming is a stealthy jamming
approach in which the jammer first senses the spectrum and
jams only when she detects an ongoing transmission. Due
to the effectiveness and difficulty to be detected, reactive
jammers are considered as the most harmful [16], [17].
Furthermore, as OFDM is used in many actual systems (and
will be used at least in the first deployments of 5G), in
our analysis we assume a BF-AWGN channel as in [11]. In
this context, we assume that Alice and Bob perform W-SKG
over a BF-AWGN channel with N parallel blocks (referred
to as subcarriers for clarity). The notation introduced in
Section II is extended with the introduction of a carrier index
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, i.e., Xi, Yi denote the randomized pilots
on the i-th subcarrier, Hi denotes the channel coefficient
in the link Alice-Bob, Wi the signal injected by Mallory
on the i-th subcarrier and NA,i, NB,i noise variables. As a
reactive jammer, Mallory senses the spectrum and jams a
specific subcarrier only when the power on it exceeds a certain
threshold pth. Two scenarios are considered: i) when pth is
fixed (determined in essence by the carrier sensing capability
of Mallory’s receiver); ii) when pth is variable (its choice
forms part of her strategy).
We can reformulate the expressions of Alice’s and Bob’s
local observations on the i-th W-SKG subcarrier as follows:
Z˜A,i = XiYiHi +XiWi +XiNA,i (14)
Z˜B,i = XiYiHi + YiWi + YiNB,i (15)
for i = 1, . . . , N with Hi ∼ CN (0, σ2), Wi ∼ CN (0, σ2Jγi),
NA,i ∼ CN (0, 1), NB,i ∼ CN (0, 1). In this work, we assume
that Alice and Bob use the same power p on all pilots,
in agreement with common practice during the advantage
distillation phase; the more general scenario of an arbitrary
power allocation across the subcarriers will be investigated in
the future. Based on this assumption we have that E[|Xi|2] =
E[|Yi|2] = p with p ∈ [0, P ].
On the other hand, we let Mallory choose the power
allocation vector to maximize the impact of her attack. The
power Mallory uses on the i-th subcarrier is denoted by γi, so
that E[|Wi|2] = σ2Jγi. Denoting the average available power
for jamming by Γ and the power allocation of the jammer by
γ = (γ1, . . . , γN ), we assume the following short-term power
constraint:
γ ∈ RN+ ,
N∑
i=1
γi ≤ NΓ. (16)
Assuming that Hi is uncorrelated with HA,i, HB,i, i =
1, . . . , N and that the pilot randomization approach proposed
in Section II is employed, the W-SKG rate R(p, γi) =
I
Ä
Z˜A,i; Z˜B,i
ä
on the i-th subcarrier, can be expressed as a
function of p and γi, i = 1, . . . , N as [11]:
R(p, γi) = log2
Ñ
1 +
pσ2
2(1 + γiσ2J ) +
(1+γiσ2J )
2
pσ2
é
. (17)
Note that the rate in (17) is independent of the instantaneous
realizations of the fading coefficients; instead, the variations
of the channel gains expressed through the variances σ2, σ2J
determine the rate of the secret keys that can be extracted
from the wireless medium. The overall W-SKG sum-rate can
then be simply expressed as follows:
CK(p,γ) =
N∑
i=1
R(p, γi). (18)
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION STRATEGIES
Alice and Bob’s common objective is to maximize
CK(p,γ) with respect to (w.r.t.) p, while Mallory wants to
minimize CK(p,γ) w.r.t. γ. Given the opposed objectives, a
non-cooperative zero-sum game can be formulated to study
the strategic interaction between the legitimate users and the
jammer: G = ({L, J}, {AL,AJ(p)}, CK(p,γ)). The game G
has three components. Firstly, there are two players: player L
representing the legitimate users (Alice and Bob are consid-
ered to act as a single player) and player J representing the
jammer (Mallory). Secondly, player L has a set of possible
actions AL = [0, P ] while player J’s set of actions is
AJ (p)=
® {(0, . . . , 0)}, if p ≤ pth,¶
γ ∈ RN+ |
∑N
i=1 γi ≤ NΓ
©
, if p > pth.
(19)
At last, CK(p,γ), denotes the payoff function of player L.
Due to the fact that Mallory first observes the transmit
power of the legitimate users on the subcarriers and then
decides which strategy to choose (a consequence of player
J being a reactive jammer), we study a hierarchical game in
which player L is the leader and player J is the follower.
In this hierarchical game, the solution is the Stackelberg
equilibrium (SE) – rather than Nash – defined as a strategy
profile (pSE,γSE) where player L chooses his optimal strategy
first, by anticipating the strategic reaction of player J (i.e., its
best response). This can be rigorously written as:
pSE , argmax
p∈AL
N∑
i=1
R(p,γ∗(p)), and γSE , γ∗(pSE), (20)
where γ∗(p) denotes the jammer’s best response (BR) func-
tion to any strategy p ∈ AL chosen by player L, defined as
follows:
γ
∗(p) , argmin
γ∈AJ (p)
N∑
i=1
R(p,γ). (21)
We also denote by γ∗i (p) the i-th component of γ
∗(p).
A. Stackelberg equilibrium with fixed pth
In the following, we evaluate the SE of the game G
assuming that the threshold pth is predefined and fixed. The
case P ≤ pth is trivial as γSE = (0, . . . , 0), whereas, the
legitimate users will optimally use the maximum available
power so that (pSE = P ). Indeed, because of the badly chosen
threshold or low sensing capabilities of Mallory, the legitimate
transmission will never be detected on any of the subcarriers
and hence will not be jammed. In the following, we assume
that: P > pth.
Lemma 2: The BR of the jammer for any p ∈ AL chosen
by the leader defined in (21) is the uniform power allocation,
such that:
γ
∗(p) ,
ß
(Γ, . . . ,Γ), if p > pth,
(0, . . . , 0), if p ≤ pth. (22)
Proof: Note that R(p, γi) is a monotonically decreasing
convex function w.r.t γi, i = 1, . . . , N for any p > 0. We
show that the jamming power should be equally distributed on
all of the subcarriers. To prove this, we apply Jensen’s inequal-
ity using δi > 0,
∑N
i=1 δi = 1, so that R
Ä
p,
∑N
i=1 δixi
ä
≤∑N
i=1 δiR(p, xi). Substituting δi = 1/N , xi = Γ/bi, we get:
R
(
p,
N∑
i=1
Γ
Nbi
)
≤
N∑
i=1
1
N
R
Å
p,
Γ
bi
ã
⇒
NR
(
p,
1
N
N∑
i=1
Γ
bi
)
≤
N∑
i=1
R
Å
p,
Γ
bi
ã
. (23)
Applying the power constraint
∑N
i=1 Γ/bi ≤ NΓ on the LHS
of (23), for any p > pth we have:
NR (p,Γ)<
N∑
i=1
R
Å
p,
Γ
bi
ã
⇒ CK(p, (Γ, . . . ,Γ))≤CK(p,γ),
which shows that in order to minimize CK , Mallory has to
distribute her power equally on all subcarriers.
In light of this result, the W-SKG sum rate can have two
forms:
CK(p,γ
∗(p)) =
ß
NR(p,Γ), if p > pth,
NR(p, 0), if p ≤ pth, (24)
which simplifies the players’ options. Next, we address the
question of how Alice and Bob should choose their power p
optimally by considering the actions available to the players
in the game at the key points i.e. at P and pth.
Theorem 1: Depending on the available power P for
W-SKG, player L will either transmit at P or pth on all
subcarriers. The SE point of the game is unique when
P 6= pth(σ2JΓ + 1) and is given by
(pSE,γSE)=
ß{(pth, (0, . . . , 0))}, if P < pth(σ2JΓ+1),
{(P, (Γ, . . . ,Γ))}, if P > pth(σ2JΓ+1). (25)
When P = pth(σ
2
JΓ + 1), the game G has two SEs:
(pSE,γSE) ∈ {(pth, (0, . . . , 0)), (P, (Γ, . . . ,Γ))}.
Proof: Given the BR in (22) and the simplification in
(24), player L wants to find the optimal p ∈ AL that
Fig. 2. UP: SE policy compared to always transmitting with either full
power or with pth. DOWN: Functions D and F vs P . In both sub-figures,
pth = 2,Γ = 4, N = 10, σ
2
= σ2
J
= 1.
maximizes:
R(p, γ∗i (p)) =
ß
R(p, 0), if p ≤ pth,
R(p,Γ), if p > pth.
(26)
Given that R(p, γ) is monotonically increasing with p for
fixed γ, two cases are distinguished: a) p ∈ [0, pth], b) p ∈
(pth, P ]. The optimal p in each case is given by
a) argmax
p∈[0,pth]
R(p, γ∗i (p)) = argmax
p∈[0,pth]
R(p, 0) = pth,
b) argmax
p∈(pth,P ]
R(p, γ∗i (p)) = argmax
p∈(pth,P ]
R(p,Γ) = P.
From a) and b), we conclude that the overall solution is pSE =
argmax
p∈AL
R(p, γ∗i (p)) =
 pth, if R(P,Γ) < R(pth, 0),P, if R(P,Γ) > R(pth, 0),{pth, P}, if R(P,Γ) = R(pth, 0).
To simplify the three possibilities, we focus on the case
when transmitting at full power R(P,Γ) (hence being sensed
and jammed) is equal to the case when player L is transmit-
ting at threshold pth (the jammer is silent) i.e., R(P,Γ) =
R(pth, 0). Using this equality, and by substituting appropri-
ately into (17), we obtain a quadratic equation in P :
P 2(2σ2pth+1)−P (2pth2σ2+2σ2JΓpth2σ2)−(1+σ2JΓ)2pth2=0,
which has a unique positive root equal to pth(σ
2
JΓ+1). Given
that, the leading coefficient of (27): (2σ2pth+1) ≥ 0 and that
P > 0, we can say that the inequalities R(P,Γ) > R(pth, 0)
and R(P,Γ) < R(pth, 0) are equivalent to P > pth(σ
2
JΓ + 1)
and P < pth(σ
2
JΓ + 1), respectively.
Some numerical results are presented in Fig. 2 for a total
number of SKG subcarriers N = 10 (pertinent to narrowband
IoT applications), pth = 2, Γ = 4, and σ
2 = σ2J = 1. The top
figure compares the achievable rates of the SE strategy and of
two alternative strategies consisting in transmitting with fixed
p = P or p = pth. The bottom figure depicts the following
quantities:
F =
CK(p
SE,γSE)− CK(P, (Γ, . . . ,Γ))
CSEK
, (27)
Fig. 3. Relative gain of player J , evaluated by function E, for strategic pth
and fixed pth = 2 when N = 10, σ
2
J
= 1 and UP: Γ = 4, DOWN: σ2 = 1.
D =
CK(p
SE,γSE)− CK(pth, (0, . . . , 0))
CSEK
, (28)
where F and D represent the jammer’s gain (or legitimate
users’ loss) if player L deviates from the SE point (indeed,
if player L transmits at P > pth, the jammer will jam at
γ∗i (P ) = Γ; and if player L transmits at pth the jammer will
not detect it and will remain silent). Both figures show that
deviating from the SE point can decrease the achievable sum-
rates by up to 85%.
B. Stackelberg equilibrium with strategic pth
Finally, we investigate how Mallory could optimally adjust
pth and how her choice will impact Alice’s and Bob’s strate-
gies. Allowing pth to vary modifies the game under study as
follows Gˆ = ({L, J}, {AL, AˆJ (p)}, CK(p,γ, pth)), where:
AˆJ (p) ,
®{((0, . . . , 0), pth), pth ≥ 0}, if pth ≥ p,¶
(γ, pth) ∈ RN+1+ |
∑N
i=1 γi ≤ NΓ
©
, if pth < p.
(29)
The BR of jammer can then be defined as:
(γ̂∗(p), p̂th
∗(p)) , argmin
(γ,pth)∈AˆJ (p)
CK(p,γ, pth). (30)
Lemma 3: The BR of player J in this case is a set of
strategies:
(γ̂∗(p), p̂th
∗(p)) ∈ { ((Γ, . . . ,Γ), ǫ), ǫ ∈ [0, p)}. (31)
Proof: The problem that the jammer wants to solve is:
min
(γ,pth)∈AˆJ (p)
CK(p,γ, pth), which can be split as follows:
min
pth≥0
min
γ∈AˆJ (p)
CK(p,γ(p), pth). (32)
The solution of the inner minimization is already known from
(22). For the outer problem we have to find the optimal pth ≥
Fig. 4. Relative gain of player J , evaluated by function E, for different
values of pth for N = 10, σ
2
J
= 1 and Γ = 4.
0 that minimizes CK(p, γ̂
∗(p), pth). Given that:
min
pth≥0
CK(p, γ̂
∗(p), pth)=
ß
NR(p,Γ, pth), if pth < p,
NR(p, 0, pth), if pth ≥ p,
(33)
and that R(p,Γ, pth) < R(p, 0, pth) the jammer can optimally
choose any threshold such that pth = ǫ, ∀ǫ < p. meaning,
any ongoing transmission is sensed and jammed.
Theorem 2: The game Gˆ has an infinite number of SEs:
(p̂SE, γ̂SE, p̂th
SE
) ∈ { (P, (Γ, . . . ,Γ), ǫ), ∀ǫ < P}. (34)
Proof: Given the BR of player J , we will now evaluate
the SE of the game Gˆ. The definition for p̂SE is given as:
p̂SE , arg
p∈AL
maxCK(p, γ̂
∗(p), p̂th(p)
∗). (35)
Since the jammer will act as in (31), we have:
CK(p, γ̂
∗(p), p̂th(p)
∗) = NR(p,Γ, ǫ), ∀ǫ < p, (36)
and the fact that R(p,Γ, ǫ) is monotonically increasing with
p results in p̂SE = P .
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 illustrate the gain of the jammer (or the
loss in W-SKG rate) when pth is part of her strategy, with
utility function CK(p,γ, pth), compared to the case when it
is not, with utility function CK(p,γ). We evaluate this gain
by:
E =
CK(p
SE ,γSE)− CK(p̂SE , γ̂SE , p̂thSE)
CK(pSE ,γSE)
. (37)
As in Fig. 2 the total number of subcarriers is N = 10 and
σ2J = 1. The non-strategic threshold on Fig. 3 is set to pth = 2
and the quantity E is evaluated for different values of σ2 and
Γ. The numerical results demonstrate that when pth is part of
Mallory’s strategy, she can be a significantly more effective
opponent, compared to the case when pth is fixed, confirming
that reactive jammers can indeed pose a serious threat. This
is also confirmed by the results on Fig. 4 where the relative
gain of the jammer is presented for different pth. As expected
with decreasing the threshold her gain increases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, injection and reactive jamming attacks were
analyzed in W-SKG systems and optimal power allocation
policies were investigated in BF-AWGN channels. It was
shown that pilot randomization can reduce injection MiM
attacks to less harmful jamming attacks. An intelligent re-
active jammer should optimally jam with equal power on the
whole spectrum. Furthermore, a strategically chosen jamming
threshold just below the power level used by the legitimate
users, allows the adversary to launch a much more effective
attack. In this case, the legitimate users have no choice but to
transmit at full power.
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